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The current listing identifies the holders of key positions at TNI (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia, or Indonesian National Military) Headquarters, as well as at the army's 
central and regional commands between March 1, 2003 and August 31, 2005. As noted 
in the last update of current military data in 2003, we have had difficulty in 
systematically updating personnel changes at the Korem (Military Resort Command), 
largely due to the absence of the TNI-owned daily newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata, 
since the financial crisis of 1997.2 We now rely mainly on the official letters of TNI 
Commander-in-Chief and general newspapers, both national and local, in collecting 
data regarding officer corps and their posts. Although the information on Korem 
commanders is not very satisfactory, it is still possible to analyze macro-trends in 
leadership transformation at the local level.
The period covered in this update, i.e., from March 2003 to August 2005, has seen 
significant developments in post-reformasi civil-military relations. We have seen: 1) the 
all-out war in Aceh under martial law (May 2003-May 2004); 2) parliamentary 
elections in April 2004; 3) direct presidential elections in July and September 2004 for 
the first time in Indonesian history; and 4) the birth of a new government led by a 
retired army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in October 2004. How did they 
shape Indonesia's civil-military relations? The war in Aceh greatly empowered those 
TNI officers who had demanded that the military take on a larger role in internal 
security. The post-Suharto attempt by reformers to limit the military function to the 
defense field stalled in this process. The elections in 2004 also boosted the political 
bargaining power of TNI leadership vis-a-vis party politicians and contributed to the
1 We would like to thank Dr. Jun Hortna of Ritsumeikan University for his invaluable contribution to this 
military update.
2 The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 75 (April 2003): 9-59.
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decline in civilian initiatives to curb TNI's institutional political autonomy. Clearly, 
the post-Suharto military reform was in deadlock, casting a deep shadow over 
Indonesia's future democracy. It is against this backdrop that a new civilian initiative 
has emerged under the new government led by President Yudhoyono. However, the 
extent to which this initiative suspends efforts to reform the TNI and enhances the 
powers of the civilian leadership to control the political autonomy of TNI is still 
unknown. In what follows, we will examine these developments.
Below, we start with the analysis of personnel changes during the period covered 
by this report. We then look at the ascendancy of TNI hard-liners under the Megawati 
government in engaging war in Aceh. We next examine the civil-military relations 
during the 2004 elections. Finally, the initiative of military reform under the 
Yudhoyono administration will be examined.
A. Ethnic-Regional and Academy Backgrounds
The present listing (see cutoff data below) involves seventy-two leading positions 
for general-ranking officers. Table 1 shows that the ethnic distribution has continued 
in the general pattern, as Javanese officers constitute about a half of the total. Their 
share is now 56.9 percent, which is substantially higher than the 45.8 percent of the 
previous listing. Apart from Javanese, Sundanese officers are well represented 
(increased from the previous five to nine) in the present listing; it is not clear what 
accounts for this change.
Table 1












Table 2 shows the timing of personnel changes during the period of this listing. It 
involves officeholders of seventy-two general-ranking positions in the TNI 
Headquarters and the army's central and regional structure, but excludes Korem 
commanders who are colonels. One remarkable feature we notice about the pattern of 
rotation is that there was only one big "wave" of personnel changes, which affected 
more than one hundred men in the officer corps, between March 2003 and August 
2005. In our previous listing, there were four significant turnovers within two years.
Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite 125
In the present listing, the personnel change in October 2003 is the only one that can be 
identified as a big wave.3 A clear ramification of this development is the stagnation of 
the pace of generational change within TNI, as we will discuss below. Nevertheless, 
some of the middle-scale personnel changes in the last two and one half years are 
significant enough to help us understand developments inside the TNI.









April - - -
May - 1 1
June 2 3 5
July 1 3 4
August - - -
September - 4 4
October 6 10 16
November - - -
December - 2 2
January - 1 1
February 3 - 3
March - - -
April - - -
May 2 5 7
June - - -
July - - -
August - - -
September - 1 1
October - 2 2
November 1 - 1
December - 1 1
January - 7 7
February - 1 1
March - 8 8
April 2 - 2
May 6 9 15
June - - -
July - - -
August 1 - 1
Totals 24 59 83
The May 2003 reshuffle took place just before the collapse of the peace process 
between the government and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh
3 The reshuffle in May 2005 affected fifteen positions in the listing, but its total impact was limited to 
seventy-eight officers.
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Merdeka, GAM), which was followed by the introduction of martial law in Aceh. Maj. 
Gen. Djali Jusuf, who was the commander of Kodam Iskandar Muda responsible for 
overseeing Aceh, was replaced by Brig. Gen. Endang Suwaryo. The official 
explanation for the replacement was that Djali Jusuf would retire soon. But military 
insiders saw Djali, an Acehnese, as incapable of conducting counterinsurgency 
warfare against his fellow Acehnese "professionally," which indicated that he should 
be replaced. Endang was trusted by the TNI leadership because of his reputation as 
an "Aceh expert" who had commanded Korem 012 (Banda Aceh) and supported Djali 
as the Chief of Staff of Kodam Iskandar Muda. The May reshuffle was followed by the 
personnel change in June 2003 with the appointment of Maj. Gen. (Marines) Luthfie 
Witto (previously assistant for intelligence to the Chief of General Staff) as the Head 
of Military Strategic Intelligence Body (BAIS, Badan Intelijen Strategis); the 
appointment of Brig. Gen. Dadi Sutanto (formerly assistant for security to Army Chief 
of Staff) as assistant for intelligence to the Chief of General Staff; and the appointment 
of Brig. Gen. Lilik Sumaryo (formerly deputy assistant for intelligence to Army Chief 
of Staff) as Chief of Staff at Kodam I/Bukit Barisan. This led to the strengthening of 
the wartime intelligence function available for Commander-in-Chief Gen. Endriartono 
Sutarto and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu.
Then a large turnover took place in October 2003, affecting 123 officers.4 It 
involved personnel changes in some vital positions, among others, including: Deputy 
Army Chief of Staff and the positions of four Kodam commanders in Jakarta, Ambon, 
Central Java, and South Sumatra. The promotion of Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, Kodam 
Jaya Commander, to a new role as Deputy Army Chief of Staff made him the 
strongest candidate to become the next Army Chief of Staff, while his successor as 
Kodam Jaya Commander, Maj. Gen. Agustadi, appeared to follow Djoko. As the most 
successful graduates of the military academy in Class 1975 and 1974, respectively, 
Djoko Santoso and Agustadi have long been regarded as officers who will lead the 
military one day. It is important also to note that the reshuffle paved the way for a 
Class 1977 officer to become a general for the first time, with the promotion of Col. 
Hotma Marbun (Korem Commander in Balikpapan) to the Deputy Commander of 
Army "elite" Special Forces (Kopassus).5
The February 2004 reshuffle resulted in two notable developments.6 First, there 
was a replacement involving TNI's number two position when the Chief of General 
Staff (Kasum TNI), Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, retired from the service and was 
replaced by Air Rear-Marshal Wartoyo. This was the first time in the history of the 
Indonesian military that an air force general occupied this strategic position. Second, 
the reshuffle paved the way for the first "non-army" general to be the Commander of 
Military Staff and Command School (Sesko TNI). It should also be noted that another
4 The reshuffle is usually announced in the form of an official order from the TNI commander. This time, 
the order came in the form of the Surat Keputasan Panglima TNI (Skep) No.342/ X / 2003, dated October 
24, 2003.
5 Hotma Marbun built his reputation in the early 1990s when he commanded the Indonesian contingent 
for the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. He graduated at the top of his class from the Army Staff and 
Command School.
6 See Skep No.43/11/2004, signed on February 16, 2004.
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Class 1977 graduate was promoted to the rank of general when an intelligence officer, 
Col. Hotmangradja Panjaitan, was named the Head of Army Information Center.7
The reshuffle in May 2004 took place one year after the imposition of martial law 
in Aceh.8 Brig. Gen. George Toisutta, a noted intelligence officer who had served as 
the head of Military Operations Command in Aceh since December 2003, was 
promoted to become the Commander of the First Infantry Division of Army Strategic 
Reserve Command (Kostrad), no doubt a reward for his service in Aceh. Such a trend 
was evident in the reshuffle in January 2005 as well, when two Korem Commanders 
in Aceh obtained promotions and were posted to Kostrad: Col. Gerhan Lantara 
(Commander of Banda Aceh Korem) and Col. A. Y. Nasution (Commander of Lho 
Seumawe Korem) became Chiefs of Staff of the First and Second Infantry Divisions of 
Kostrad, respectively.9 All these illustrate that command experience in Aceh has 
become a stepping stone for the current generation of officers who wish to rise in the 
military hierarchy, just as East Timor had been for the older-generation officers in the 
mid-1970s to the late 1990s. In this regard, Papua will possibly follow Aceh as the 
proving ground for the selection of new "elites" from the next generation of officers. 
The TNI's plan—announced in March 2005—to create a third infantry division of 
Kostrad in Papua clearly indicates the development.
The reshuffle in February-March 2005 had the most significant impact during the 
period covered by this listing, as it involved the replacement of all three service 
chiefs.10 When he was inaugurated as president on October 20, 2004, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono most likely planned to rectify the legacy of the Megawati administration 
by removing Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu and promoting Lt. Gen. Djoko 
Santoso as his successor. But because of Megawati's midnight appointment of 
Ryamizard as Commander-in-Chief, replacing Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, 
Yudhoyono's plans were delayed, as we will discuss in the following sections. But it is 
useful to note that because of Megawati's last minute maneuver, hardly any 
significant reshuffle took place in the first three months of the new administration, 
with the notable exception of the appointment of Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo as 
Commander of Kostrad, the post that had been held by Army Chief of Staff Gen. 
Ryamizard Ryacudu since Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo's retirement in September.
7 Hotmangradja was the former Commander of Group-3 (covert operations) in Kopassus. He was master 
of ceremonies at the TNI anniversary celebration in 2001 and later became Korem Commander in 
Denpasar. It is unusual for an intelligence officer—soaked in the culture of secrecy—to be appointed as 
spokesman for the army.
8 See Skep No.170/V2004, dated May 25, 2004. This reshuffle affected eighty-two officers. Martial law in 
Aceh was downgraded to a civil emergency on May 19, 2004, but the scale of military operations 
remained unchanged.
9 With this rotation, Gerhan and Nasution became brigadier generals. Gerhan is the first general among 
the Class 1978 graduates, while Nasution, a graduate of Class 1977, joined Hotma Marbun and 
Hotmangradja in becoming a general. President Yudhoyono is said to favor Gerhan and Nasution, both 
of whom handled international aid in post-tsunami Aceh. But to the international community, Gerhan is 
known for his brutal shooting of demonstrators in the Santa Cruz incident of November 1991 in East 
Timor. It should also be noted that Nasution's successor as Commander of Korem Lho Seumawe is Col. 
Chairawan, the former Commander of Group-4 in Kopassus, who was removed from his post due to his 
involvement in the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in the last days of Suharto.
10 See Presidential Order (Surat Keputusan Presiden No.6/ TNI / 2005) signed on February 16, 2005, and 
TNI Commander's Order (Skep N o.122/III/2005) dated March 30, 2005.
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Yudhoyono also withdrew Ryamizard's appointment as Military Commander-in- 
Chief.
In this context, Djoko Santoso's appointment as Army Chief of Staff signified the 
first major effort of the new president to shape the military leadership in his favor. 
Yudhoyono has known Djoko since the former was the Korem Commander in 
Yogyakarata in the mid-1990s. It was Yudhoyono who recruited Djoko as his deputy 
when he was the Military Chief of Social and Political Staff and made him a brigadier 
general in the late 1990s.11 Apart from Djoko, the new Chiefs of Navy and Air Force 
are Yudhoyono's classmates in the military academy (the Class 1973), and they have 
known each other for more than three decades. These leadership changes were 
followed by another rotation in the following month, which affected twenty-three 
officers, including three Kodam Commanders (Iskandar Muda, Udayana, and 
Tanjungpura). The Aceh Commander, Maj. Gen. Endang Suwaryo, became Deputy 
Army Chief of Staff and Djoko Santoso's successor.12 Yudhoyono's brothers-in-law— 
Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono and Brig. Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo—were also 
promoted.13 In this way, the reshuffle in February-March 2005 laid the foundations 
for Yudhoyono's control over the TNI. The rise of Pramono Edhie Wibowo was also 
noteworthy, not only because he represented the first Class 1980 officer who was 
promoted to a general's rank, but, and more importantly, because he was promoted to 
become the Deputy Commander-General of Kopassus, replacing Brig. Gen. Hotma 
Marbun, a Class 1977 rising star.
Finally, the reshuffle in May 2005 affected seventy-eight officers and replaced 
another three Commanders in Kodam Trikora, Wirabuana, and Brawijaya.14 
Consequently, six out of twelve Kodam Commanders were replaced in the rotation of 
March and May 2005, with Djoko Santoso, the new Army Chief of Staff, consolidating 
his leadership position in the army. The prominence of Aceh-related generals was also 
evident this time, as Maj. Gen. George Toisutta was appointed as Commander of 
Kodam Trikora overseeing Papua, and Maj. Gen. Bambang Darmono, who had 
commanded Aceh Operations Command during the first six months of the martial 
law (and was subsequently replaced by Toisutta), was appointed as Commander of 
Army Infantry Weapons Center.15 In sum, personnel changes during the period from
11 Yudhoyono was the only military officer who attended the symposium organized by JICA (fapan 
International Cooperation Agency) in Tokyo, in August 1999, which sought to identify key players in the 
incoming administration (as yet undetermined) to be inaugurated in October 1999. Five years later, a 
similar conference was held in Tokyo in August 2004. When Yudhoyono was consulted in July 2004 
about who should be invited to the conference to represent the future of TNI, he suggested Lt. Gen.
Djoko Santoso.
12 Some TNI insiders criticize this appointment as lacking in objectivity and professionalism. Endang had 
served only in the Aceh Command as a two-star general, while other officers—such as Cornelis 
Simbolon, Agustadi, and Hadi Waluyo—had undertaken several assignments while they were two-star 
generals. Again, the "Aceh factor" seems to have influenced Endang's promotion. It should be noted that 
Endang is also an academy classmate of Yudhoyono's.
13 See Section D below for more discussions about them.
14 There were two reshuffles in this month. See Skep No. 191 / V/ 2005 dated May 16, 2005 and Skep 
No.200/V/2005 dated May 25, 2005.
Apart from these changes, Yudhoyono recruited Col. Kurdi Mustofa, an expert staff at Lemhannas, as 
his private secretary. Kurdi had served Yudhoyono under the Megawati government as deputy assistant 
to Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. Kurdi also joined Yudhoyono's presidential 
election campaign team. Prior to this, Yudhoyono also handpicked his long-time friend, whom he had
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March 2003 to August 2005 were, it seems, influenced by three major factors, namely 
Aceh, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the coming of age of Class 1977 officers.
Tables 3 and 4 below show the distribution of officers according to Class. Within 
the two and half years, the dominant force shifted from the Classes 1971-72 to the 
Classes 1973-74 in the TNI Headquarters, and from the Classes 1973-74 to the Classes 
1974-75 in the army. The Class 1974 maintained its presence in both the TNI HQ and 
the army, thanks largely to their leader, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu. But 
following his departure in February 2005, the Class 1974 officers will have to share 
strategic positions at the TNI headquarters and at the army central and regional 
commands with Classes 1975 and 1976 officers. It is too early to say how fast Djoko 
Santoso will promote officers from Classes 1977 and after who are expecting to obtain 
their own share of responsibilities and promotions. Many of the members of Classes 
1977 and after are already colonels supplying most of the current Korem commanders 
and expecting to be promoted to brigadier generals in the near future.
Table 3: Academy Class Distribution of Officers in Strategic Positions
(Feb. 28, 2003) (August 2005)
Class of TNI HQ Army TNI HQ Army
1971 5 4 2 -
1972 5 10 2 3
1973 2 8 3 12
1974 2 12 4 13
1975 - 5 - 11
1976 - 1 - 2
1977 - - - -
1978 - - - -
1980 - - - 1
Unknown 2 3 - 2
Navy 2 - 4 -
Air Force 3 - 1 -
Marines 1 - 1 -
known since his academy years, Maj. Gen. Bambang Sutedjo, Assistant for Logistics to Army Chief of 
Staff, as presidential military secretary.
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1973 7 - 7 (10.6%)
1974 7 1 8 (12.1%)
1975 7 7 14 (21.2%)
1976 2 9 11 (16.6%)
1977 - 5 5 (7.5%)
1978 - 7 7 (10.6%)
1980 - 8 8 (12.1%)
Unknown 1 5 6 (9.%)
Total 24 42 66
B. Megawati and her Generals: The Hard-line Trend
For the post-reformasi TNI leadership, the presidencies of B. J. Habibie and 
Abdurrahman Wahid were times of confusion. During the Habibie era, TNI "failed" 
to stop his policy of allowing a voters' referendum in East Timor, which resulted in 
the separation of the territory from Indonesia. Wiranto, the TNI Commander-in-Chief 
at that time, has been blamed by his seniors for his failure to protect TNI's interests in 
East Timor and for disgracing TNI as an institution, as its covert operations produced 
nothing but a dirty war. The Abdurrahman Wahid presidency was also a difficult 
time for TNI, which was haunted by the institutional memory of being trapped by a 
fight between intra-military factions, as demonstrated publicly in the case of Lt. Gen. 
Agus Wirahadikusumah.1 Now, under the Megawati administration, Endriartono's 
TNI was well aware of previous lessons. As if to avoid a repeat of East Timor, TNI 
seized the initiative in the Aceh conflict, with a clear hope of overthrowing the fragile 
peace accord.16 7
TNI's maneuvers escalated in March 2003, just three months after the signing of 
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Indonesian government 
and GAM. In early March, the army-mobilized "residents" in Central Aceh, who were 
mostly Javanese, protested against the peace process and attacked the office of the 
Joint Security Council (JSC) that had monitored the ceasefire between TNI and GAM. 
This movement spread to other areas, as seen in East Aceh and Pidie, where similar 
residential groups of more than one hundred people protested JSC in mid-March and 
called for its dissolution. As if to provoke these movements, the army opened its 
annual leadership meeting (Rapim) in late March in Aceh, the first time it has ever 
been held in the region. Soldiers of Kodam Iskandar Muda forcefully mobilized 
thousands of residents to stage a welcoming show for the Rapim, during which they
16 See our previous analysis in Indonesia 75 (April 2003).
17 Many TNI elites were frustrated with the internationally mediated peace negotiation between the 
government and the separatist GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeaka, or Free Aceh Movement), since they felt 
that it only helped internationalize the issue and invite sympathy for GAM. See Edward Aspinall and 
Harold Crouch, "Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed?" report (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2003).
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announced a demand that the number of army troops stationed in Aceh be increased. 
Backed by the "spontaneous" action of residents, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard 
Ryacudu claimed that "the people in Aceh wish to close down the JSC."18 The Rapim 
in Aceh in effect encouraged TNI-backed militia groups in the region to conduct 
campaigns against the peace process. In South Aceh, East Aceh, and West Aceh, 
trucks carrying hundreds, even thousands, of people arrived at JSC offices and 
violently demanded JSC's withdrawal from Aceh, without being stopped by security 
forces. As a result, a major evacuation of JSC staff took place in early April.
The military-orchestrated anti-peace movements were clearly acts of sabotage 
against Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating Minister for Political 
and Security Affairs, who was handling the peace process. One of his staff recalled 
that "Yudhoyono, as the caretaker of CoHA, should have moved to prevent 
Ryamizard and his circles from openly challenging the government policy, but he had 
no guts to do so."19 With no alternative option to save the peace process, the 
Megawati government, on the recommendation of the TNI top brass, finally decided 
to end peace negotiations with GAM and declared martial law in Aceh in May 2003. 
The government dispatched around 35,000 troops to conduct an all-out 
counterinsurgency war against GAM, which was estimated to have five thousand 
rebels. This was the largest military operation the TNI had undertaken in its history. 
Having controlled the flow of information from the field under martial law, the TNI 
used this advantage vis-a-vis the government to shape public discourse, stoking 
nationalistic sentiment and disseminating the idea that the imposition of martial law 
would preserve the territorial integrity of Indonesia. Here, "defending NKRI (Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary Republic of Indonesia)" became a slogan, and 
it was perhaps Ryamizard who basked most comfortably in this nationalist 
chauvinism, which effectively conflated nationalism and TNI "heroism."
His hawkish stance was evident not only in Aceh, but also in the drafting of the 
TNI bill. The bill, which was supposed to be drafted by a working group (Pokja) 
consisting of academics and military representatives, was virtually deadlocked in 
March 2003, as the civilians protested against the army's insistence on including the 
so-called Article 19 authorizing TNI to dispatch troops without presidential approval 
in the event of an emergency. This article was widely criticized by the public for 
opening a loophole that might allow a military coup, and those who participated in 
the working group soon learned that it was Ryamizard who was campaigning for the 
article despite his public denial.20 In light of the strong public criticism of TNI's 
resistance toward the institutionalization of civilian supremacy and civilian control of 
the military, TNI headquarters finally capitulated by admitting that the article could 
contradict the National Defense Law of 2002 and that the controversial article should 
be dropped from the draft bill.21
18 "Jenderal Ryamizard Ryacudu: Rakyat Bilang, Bubarkan Saja JSC," Tempo, April 7-13, 2003.
19 Interview with a Ministerial Assistant at the Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs, 
May 2004.
20 "More Analysts Give Thumbs-down to Military Bill," Jakarta Post, February 25, 2003; "Ryamizard 
Ryacudu: Kudeta itu Binatang Apa, Sih?" Tempo, March 10-16, 2003.
21 See, for example, "Mayor Jenderal Sudradjat: Pasal 19 itu Memang Rawan," Tempo, March 10-16, 2003; 
"TNI Tidak Seri us Kembali ke Barak," Suara Pembaruan, March 18, 2003. Maj. Gen. Sudradjat
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Despite the withdrawal of the "coup article," many critics believed that 
Ryamizard would not change his old-fashioned approach to civil-military relations.22 
Just this February, he had hosted a closed-door meeting with hundreds of active and 
retired top officers, during which he argued that the army was entitled to play a 
greater role in security affairs.23 For many, Ryamizard's statement sent a clear signal 
that the current army leadership wanted to derail the TNI reform that had managed 
to take one step forward after the passage of the National Defense Law (UU 
No.3/2002 tentang Pertahanan Nasional) in 2002, a law that limited the role of the 
military to defense. Ryamizard had repeatedly insisted that the role of the TNI should 
be different from that of "Western" militaries, which were not facing the threat of 
national disintegration. The military's old guard invoked the "non-Western" nature of 
the TNI to oppose the principle of the National Defense Law.
However, when the Defense Department issued its first White Paper in March 
2003, it was clear that TNI was deploying a more powerful "Western" concept to 
justify its broader security function. Here, the idea of Military Operation Other than 
War (MOOTW) was described as a standard military function in the post-Cold War 
environment, where nontraditional threats, such as terrorism and transnational 
crimes, increasingly became the object of military response in the global arena. 
Indonesia's Defense White Paper insisted that MOOTW, or Operasi Militer Selain 
Perang (OMSP), is within the TNI's proper domain and argued that the army is 
responsible for internal security.24 Simultaneously invoking both the nationalist 
discourse of NKRI and the globalist discourse of OMSP, TNI became more assertive in 
opposing civilian demands that would limit the TNI's role to external defense.
The clear risk of granting the TNI a free hand in handling internal security was 
evident in November 2003, when the government tried to review the martial law 
status of Aceh after the initial period of six months. Since the beginning of martial 
law, Yudhoyono had asked his personal advisors, a group that included civilian 
defense experts and human rights activists, to formulate an "exit strategy" for military 
operations in Aceh based on the assessment that the conflict in Aceh could never be 
solved by the military approach and should therefore be addressed by civilians 
spearheading nonmilitary approaches. Megawati herself also wanted the war to end
(Director-General of Defense Strategy, Department of Defense) was involved in the drafting process and 
recognized the need to accommodate social criticism. Finally, Endriartono instructed that the article be 
removed from the draft law.
22 When he was Kodam Jaya commander, Ryamizard once told one of the Editors that he saw nothing 
wrong with the military under Suharto and that no military reform was necessary.
23 See, for example, "Army Wants Power Again," Jakarta Post, February 21, 2003; "TNI Led by 
Antireformists," Jakarta Post, March 1, 2003. Those who attended the meeting included Yudhoyono, Lt. 
Gen. (ret) Hari Sabarno (Minister of Home Affairs), Lt. Gen. (ret) Sutiyoso (Jakarta Governor), Gen. (ret) 
Wiranto, Gen. (ret) R. Hartono (former Army Chief of Staff), Gen. (ret) Subagyo Hadisiswoyo (former 
Army Chief of Staff), and Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo (former Kostrad Commander and a son-in-law of 
Suharto). Yudhoyono's close friends advised him against attending the meeting because the 
meeting—arranged by Ryamizard—might serve as an occasion for blaming Yudhoyono's "soft" 
approach to GAM.
24 The White Paper we refer to here is Departmen Pertahanan, Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 
21 (Jakarta: Dephan, 2003). MOOTW is a US military doctrine adopted in 1995. Cf. Joint Publication 3-07, 
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), available at
<http: / / www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/ new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf>.
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quickly, as she stated in her presidential speech on October 5.25 Moreover, the 
National Commission of Human Rights, a government body that actually has some 
independence, also called for an end to martial law after its fact-finding team 
uncovered evidence of human rights abuses by the military against civilians in 
Aceh.26 In order to lift martial law, Yudhoyono needed to find an alternative model 
of governance in Aceh, an action necessitated by the fact that the TNI had effectively 
hijacked the local administration since May 2003. Aceh needed capable administration 
of its local political economy, and Yudhoyono found the corrupt Governor Abdullah 
Puteh unsuitable for the task of rebuilding the local government. Yudhoyono 
attempted to remove Puteh from his position.
The army was quick to slap down the initiative to end martial law. A mere six 
days after Megawati's October 5 speech, "spontaneous" demonstrations broke out in 
Bireun. It is hard to believe that such rallies could have been organized without the 
backing of local army troops. Demonstrators who claimed to represent Aceh's citizens 
were calling for the extension of martial law in a bid to maintain stability in their 
communities. This rally became a model and was repeated in other areas in the 
following weeks. Political analysts widely believed that these actions were part of a 
larger effort to stigmatize opposition to martial law and limit public debate.27 
Whether Martial Law Administrator Maj. Gen. Endang Suwarya had a role in 
directing the mobilization of mass rallies, or if he simply allowed them, cannot be 
determined, but local reports stated that field troops, with the help of army-organized 
militias, orchestrated the demonstrations. For ordinary citizens, failure to join the rally 
meant being accused of disloyalty to "NKRI" at best and of being a "GAM member" 
at worse.28 Armed with so-called public support, the army then "proposed" the 
extension of martial law for another six months.29 This move effectively stymied 
Yudhoyono's initiative to formulate an exit strategy for the war in Aceh. Moreover, he 
failed to replace Puteh in mid-October.30 Yudhoyono thus lost his leadership in
25 "Konflik di Aceh Segera Diselesaikan," Media Indonesia, October 6, 2003.
26 The imposition of martial law effectively restricted freedom of association and movement in Aceh and 
sparked a secret war against GAM. Many credible reports suggest that systematic atrocity was widely 
and openly conducted by TNI troops under the martial law. Consult, for example, the following reports: 
International Crisis Group, "Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds" (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG), July 23, 
2003; Kontras, "Martial Law in Aceh After Two Months: The Sufferings of Aceh, the Burden of 
Indonesians" (Jakarta: Kontras), July 2003; Teuku Samsel Bahri, "Aceh Province: Dirty War Uncovered" 
(Kontras-Aceh), September 30, 2003; "Civil War in Aceh Stoked by Wealth, Corruption," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 9, 2003; and "Aceh Under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War," Human Rights 
Watch 15,10, December 2003.
Rodd McGibbon, "Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?" 
report (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 52.
28 Personal communication with Acehnese activists in Kuala Lumpur, September 2003.
29 The proposal of the army was virtually a demand. The martial law spokesman, Colonel Ditya 
Sudarsono, actually insisted that the government should respect the voice of the people who demanded 
the extension of martial law in early November.
30 Yudhoyono was said to have requested Endang, via Endriartono, to "impeach" Puteh as governor of 
Aceh in mid-October. Yudhoyono sought to organize an anti-Puteh coalition in the provincial parliament 
(DPRD/NAD) in the hope that it would reject Puteh's annual accountability report (Laporan 
Pertanggunjawaban, LPj) submitted to the DPRD/NAD. Yudhoyono was shocked when even TNI 
members in the parliament ignored the order and approved Puteh's LPj. As a result, Puteh was allowed 
to continue his term of office as governor, and Yudhoyono's post-martial-law vision was completely 
stymied.
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solving the conflict in Aceh. In mid-November, Megawati declared a six-month 
extension of the military emergency. Encouraged by this action, the outspoken Army 
Chief of Staff Ryamizard brazenly asserted that those who opposed martial law were 
in league with GAM.31 Large anti-GAM fronts were established in Aceh with some 
ten thousand citizens "voluntarily" registering their membership.32 The public 
demand throughout Indonesia to end the military operation and audit the martial law 
expenditures, which lacked transparency, was ignored by Jakarta's political elite.
In sum, civil-military relations in 2003 were significantly conditioned by the 
drafting of the TNI bill and the war in Aceh. The TNI, as an institution, actively 
expanded the domain of the military. TNI's desire to include Article 19 in the draft bill 
indicated a New Order mindset that viewed the military's praetorian mission as being 
above—and independent from—political authority. The article was withdrawn only 
when TNI capitulated to public pressure. In the war in Aceh, however, TNI enjoyed 
relative autonomy in manipulating information on the battlefield, and its control of 
information allowed the military elites to manufacture reality, orchestrate public 
discourse, and shape the direction of government policy. Such an institutional power 
was clearly generated from TNI's territorial structure, which had persistently worked 
to control local politico-economic-human resources. The power of civilian leaders and 
media critics to monitor and curb TNI's hard-line trend was very limited during the 
Megawati era, largely due to the absence of political will on the part of the president 
and the parliament.
C. TNI in the 2004 Elections: "Star Wars" and the Politics of Neutrality
Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, national elections have provided TNI with an 
opportunity to state its commitment to "reform," i.e., non-intervention in party and 
electoral politics. In the 1999 elections, the TNI as an institution declined to support 
any political parties, including its long-time partner, Golkar. However, TNI's 
purported electoral "neutrality" did not mean that individual generals were 
uniformly apathetic about securing political benefits from civilian competitions for 
power. In 1999, the army top brass was actively involved in brokering post-election 
political deals that paved the way for the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency. Such a 
practice was repeated in 2004, but with different players and under different 
circumstances, as we will see below.
In late January 2004, TNI held its annual leadership meeting (Rapim TNI). At that 
meeting, Endriartono was prepared to read his statement regarding TNI's position on
31 "You're Either With Us or Against Us," Laksamana.net, December 8, 2003.
32 As seen above, the militia-like groups had been active even before martial law was instituted, but their 
number dramatically increased after the declaration of martial law. Especially since December 2003, 
various district-based anti-GAM fronts were formed and integrated into the umbrella organization called 
Front Perlawanan Separatis GAM (FPSG). See International Crisis Group report, "Aceh: A Chance for 
Peace" (Jakarta/Brussels), August 15, 2005. See also the detailed report written by an NGO, Eye on Aceh, 
"Fear in the Shadows: Militia in Aceh" (July 2004), available at chttp:/ / www.acheh-eye.org>. 
Importantly, these "fronts" not only assisted TNI operations, but also actively sabotaged civilian efforts 
to promote transparency in martial law management. In fact, KomnasHAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia, National Pluman Rights Commission) was repeatedly subjected to pressure from these fronts to 
discontinue its investigations in Aceh.
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the general election, which would be held in April, and the presidential election, 
which would take place in July. In his statement, the Commander-in-Chief not only 
emphasized, as anticipated, that TNI would be a neutral party in the upcoming 
elections, but he also declared that soldiers who violated the order would suffer the 
maximum penalty of discharge from the military.33 His comment was expected to 
neutralize the controversial statement of Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard who, in 
October of the previous year, had asked the families of TNI members to vote for 
candidates representing the interests of the TNI, and, in December, warned that "his" 
army would deploy troops if elections turned bloody or chaotic.34 * Both statements 
provoked strong public criticism. Needless to say, sending TNI troops to deal with 
political disorder should be the decision of the government, not of the Army Chief of 
Staff. Clearly Ryamizard had been a thorn in Endriartono's flesh, since Ryamizard's 
public comments not only damaged the image of TNI, but also repeatedly trespassed 
on the authority of the Military Commander-in-Chief, as was most evident in the 
controversy over Article 19 in the TNI bill and the extension of martial law in Aceh. 
Another source of irritation to Endriartono was Ryamizard's personal connections to 
Taufik Kiemas, Megawati's husband and a small-time businessman turned 
power-broker.36 Many TNI elites still believed that Ryamizard could not have been 
appointed Army Chief of Staff without Taufik's backing and without bypassing 
Wanjakti (the military council that determines high-ranking promotions and duty 
rotations). Against this background, TNI headquarters perceived a potential danger: 
that Ryamizard might well become embroiled in electoral politics, a situation that 
would no doubt undermine the institutional autonomy of TNI.37
Endriartono was more concerned about the presidential election in July than 
legislative elections in April. As nationwide independent polls had all predicted, 
Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle) lost to Golkar in the parliamentary elections, largely due to the
33 "TNI Tugaskan Lagi Netralitasnya: Pelanggar Dikenai Sanksi," Kompas, January 23, 2004. Following 
the Rapim, a working team was established to formulate guidelines for neutrality that were far more 
detailed than ones issued for the 1999 elections. Guidelines can be found in "Buku Pedoman Tentang 
Netralitas TNI Pada Pemilu 2004" (Mabes TNI, 2004).
34 "Military Kin Told to Vote for Pro-TNI Candidates," Jakarta Post, October 17, 2003; "TNI AD Akan
Turun Jika Pemilu Berdarah," Kompas, December 23, 2003.
36 Ryamizard is the son-in-law of former vice president Try Sutrisno, who is a close friend of Megawati 
and Taufik. Therefore, Megawati's inner circle was confident that the TNI's political loyalty could be 
secured by embracing Ryamizard.
37 Interviews with general-rank active officers, May 2003, January 2004. Endriartono's personal dislike of 
Taufik also fed his suspicion of Ryamizard. In mid-2003, Endriartono was put in the unenviable position 
of defending TNI against a scandal involving the procurement of four Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia. 
Military insiders suggest that he was angered by the revelation that the so-called "Sukhoigate" expose 
implicated the business activities of Taufik Kiemas and that the Defense Department had been pressured 
to cover up the business deal, resulting in widespread public criticism of the TNI. In fact, this scandal 
spurred public investigation into the problems involved in military procurement, and strengthened 
reform pressures on TNI. On the scandal, see, for example, "Sukhoi Berselimut Kabut," Tempo, July 21-27, 
2003. On the wider problem of military procurement, see Munir, "Corruption Threatens Indonesia's 
Defense System," Jakarta Post, March 1, 2004; and an essay in the newsletter of human rights NGO, 
Imparsial, "Regional Budget for TNI: A Threat for Civilian Control over the Military (A Case Study of 
Ship Provision by Region)," Catatan Imparsial 1 (March 2004).
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widespread negative image of PDI-P as corrupt and inept. PDI-P strategists, faced 
with the public distrust of their party, decided to lean on their political machines and 
mobilized local bureaucrats, businessmen, and local informal leaders, such as kiai 
(Islamic teachers) and ethnic association bosses, to gather votes for the party. When 
this strategy failed to produce satisfactory results in April, Megawati's inner circle 
approached the Police and TNI, demanding their support for Megawati's re-election. 
Ironically, Ryamizard all but alluded to this PDI-P approach when he carelessly 
commented that he had already rejected a request from Theo Syafei, 
ex-military-officer-turned-Megawati-confidant, to support her campaign. 38 
Ryamizard also privately told his assistant about a request he had received from 
senior retired army generals now working for Megawati, asking him to instruct local 
commanders to assist Megawati's campaign through intelligence assessments of her 
rivals' strategies and through disinformation campaigns aimed at her rivals at the 
local level.39 In exchange, Taufik Kiemas promised Ryamizard the position of 
incoming TNI Commander-in-Chief. Clearly these developments concerned 
Endriartono, who had no particular enthusiasm for Megawati.40
Endriartono's concern deepened when Yudhoyono emerged as a challenger to 
Megawati. Endriartono quickly announced his decision to withdraw all TNI members 
seconded to government departments. The decision targeted bodyguards of ministers 
as well as directors-general and directors in departments other than the Defense 
Department.41 Endriartono demonstrated his intention to prevent soldiers from 
working for either Megawati or Yudhoyono, who as the incumbent president and the 
newly resigned minister of defense, respectively, had substantial influence within 
government organizations.
Despite Endriartono's move, some retired officers were concerned about the 
danger that TNI's intelligence community would become involved in the election. 
This community has a distinctive culture that does not distinguish between retired 
officers and active-duty officers, and its old-boys' network had long had exclusive 
access to intelligence information regarding politicians, business managers, religious 
leaders, and so on. Long-retired intelligence officers who had gone into business 
might still be called upon to do work for the intelligence agency. There was, thus, 
reasonable anxiety among military elites about a possible "war" within the military 
intelligence community as rival factions competed to engage in clandestine field 
operations as "invisible hands." Endriartono, TNI Commander-in-Chief, would not 
have been able to control this war.
38 "Benar-Benar Netral," Media Indonesia, April 16, 2004. Theo Syafei was a retired Maj. Gen. who had 
long been associated with Megawati as her political advisor. He was also a good friend of Gen. (ret) Try 
Sutrisno, a father-in-law of Ryamizard and Megawati's trusted man.
39 Interview with Yudhoyono's election advisor, April and September 2004.
40 Endriartono himself was initially offered the vice-presidential candidacy by Amien Rais, the Chairman 
of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) who led his political 
party, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party). The offer was, however, immediately 
rejected by Endriartono.
41 "TNI Ditarik dari Departmen," Suara Pembarmn, April 15, 2004. Endriartono's instructions were sent 
to TNI bodies via his telegram (Surat Telegram Rahasia No. STR/527/2004). However, it is not clear who 
was actually affected by his instructions and forced to leave their offices.
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Megawati's inner circle included Lt. Gen. (ret) Hendropriyono, her intelligence 
chief (Head of BIN, Badan Intelijen Negara, National Intelligence Body), who was 
responsible for the massacre of Islamist activists in Lampung under Suharto in the late 
1980s, as well as his deputy, Maj. Gen. (ret) Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto (Fifth Deputy of 
BIN), the former right-hand man of Prabowo, who was once expelled from the 
military for the alleged kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists, and Theo Syafei. All of 
them had once worked for Kopassus. On the other hand, Yudhoyono's campaign 
team (tim sukses) included a larger number of retired officers, such as Lt. Gen. (ret) 
Syamsir Siregar, former Head of Military Intelligence Body (Badan Intelijen ABRI, or 
BIA) and Maj. Gen. (ret) Achdari, former Deputy Head of BIA.42 The fact that these 
people had joined the Yudhoyono camp dismayed his civilian political advisors and 
long-time military friends. Some advised Yudhoyono to sever relations with these 
generals who seemed more interested in pushing their own agenda than in 
supporting the candidate, and warned that Yudhoyono's indebtedness to them would 
jeopardize his reform agenda if he became president. Yudhoyono ignored their 
advice.
In late April 2004, Gen. Wiranto, Suharto's former confidant, joined the 
presidential race as Golkar candidate. Cash-rich Wiranto's tim sukses geared up its 
electoral campaign in preparation for July, under the management of his long-time 
military aides, Lt. Gen. (ret) Fachrul Razi, Maj. Gen. (ret) Suaidi Marasabessy, and 
Maj. Gen. (ret) Tulus Sihombing.43 Although he was the official candidate of Golkar, 
Wiranto could not count on party chairman Akbar Tanjung's cooperation nor the 
active support of the party machinery in conducting his campaigns. Wiranto had to 
rely heavily on his own personal staff.
Megawati's, Yudhoyono's, and Wiranto's campaigns were dubbed perang bintang, 
star wars, since they involved so many retired generals who had chosen to support 
the respective candidates.
It was in the context of these "star wars" that Endriartono convened a special 
meeting with three Chiefs of Staff on May 31, the day before the start of the 
presidential election campaign. The meeting resulted in Endriartono's public 
statement which, among other things, criticized certain candidates for attempting to 
use TNI for their own political gains, although Endriartono did not name names. 
Endriartono issued five prohibitions: (1) TNI personnel, troops, and facilities were not
42 Yudhoyono's camp also had two former military commanders, namely Gen. (ret) Edi Sudrajat and 
Admiral (ret) Widodo A. S. Others included Lt. Gen. (ret) T. B. Silalahi, former Minister of 
Administrative Reform, but more commonly know as a patron of Tommy Winata, a king of underworld 
business; Lt. Gen. (ret) Muhammad Ma'ruf, former Armed Forces Chief of Social and Political Staff 
(Kassospol ABRI); Lt. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, former East Java Commander and secretary of Yudhoyono as 
Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. (ret) E. E. Mangindaan, former 
Commander of Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) and subsequently North Sulawesi Governor; 
Maj. Gen. (ret) Djali Jusuf, the first Commander of Kodam Iskandar Muda who was replaced just before 
the implementation of martial law in Aceh; and Col. Kurdi Mustofa, former deputy assistant to 
Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. Later, the Yudhoyono government 
appointed Siregar as Head of BIN, Widodo as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, T. 
B. Silalahi as presidential envoy for the post-tsunami reconstruction of Aceh, Ma'ruf as Minister of Home 
Affairs, Sudi as Cabinet Secretary, and Kurdi as personal secretary of the president.
43 Fachrul was former Deputy Commander of TNI and served under Wiranto. Suaidi, former Wirabuana 
Commander, and Sihombing, former Deputy Head of BIA, both worked under Wiranto when he was 
Commander-in-Chief of TNI.
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to be conscripted for election purposes; (2) TNI personnel and troops were not 
allowed to campaign for candidates; (3) TNI members were not to talk about 
candidates in public places, at their workplace, and even at home; (4) TNI members 
were not allowed to display campaign materials at their workplace; and (5) TNI 
members were not allowed to accompany or welcome electoral contestants.44 These 
prohibitions were meant to demonstrate publicly the military's commitment to the 
policy of maintaining institutional neutrality in electoral politics.
TNI's stated neutrality, however, did nothing to reduce its bargaining power in 
politics. In fact, the military was able to make more demands precisely when civilian 
leaders were engaged in political competition during elections. Yudhoyono faced this 
sort of pressure. After he had won the first round of the presidential election in July 
and was preparing for the head-on battle with Megawati in September, he was 
requested to make a speech in front of FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putri-Putra TNI, 
Armed Forces Sons and Daughters' Communication Forum), a nationwide youth 
group widely perceived as an assembly of hooligans, in August 2004. Since the FKPPI, 
though discredited by many, was still understood to represent military families, 
Yudhoyono in his speech said that he disagreed with the civilian demand to liquidate 
the army territorial structure.45 This statement was applauded by the FKPPI 
community, but criticized by the public, which deplored Yudhoyono's rejection of 
territorial reform. Yudhoyono's political party, Partai Demokrat, had made its policy 
platform available on the Internet, and that platform clearly stated that the party 
would work for the reform of TNI's territorial structure.46 Yet the reform agenda 
would seem to have been undermined by Yudhoyono's subsequent declaration that 
he had consulted both with Endriartono and Ryamizard about his "ignorance" of the 
party agenda to abolish territorial commands.47 The fact that Yudhoyono felt it 
necessary to fudge on his campaign promises clearly demonstrated that the military 
continued to play a substantial role in electoral politics.
Megawati's electoral campaign also annoyed the TNI. First, her campaign 
encouraged some NGOs to identify Yudhoyono as a TNI officer and to push for 
national unity under the banner of anti-militarism.48 Megawati's campaign therefore 
exploited the TNI, not by pulling soldiers out of barracks and into the political arena, 
but by invoking the specter of militarism and military dictatorship. Second, the
44 "Capres Purnawirawan Jangan Pengaruhi TNI," Kompas, June 1, 2004.
45 "SBY Minta TNI dan Polri Netral," Media Indonesia, August 2, 2004.
46 The reference was subsequently deleted from the homepage.
47 "Yudhoyono Bantah Akan Bubarkan Koter," Kompas, August 2, 2004. Before this event, Yudhoyono's 
tim sukses was contacted by the staff of Ryamizard and was informed that Ryamizard had been annoyed 
by Yudhoyono's plan to appoint his long-time friend, Lt. Gen. (ret) Agus Widjojo, to draft defense 
policies that would lead to military reform. The tim sukses immediately sent one of its members to 
Ryamizard to deny that Agus Widjojo would be appointed. The tim sukses was also apprised of 
Ryamizard's concern about the possible promotion of Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso (then Deputy Army Chief 
of Staff) to become the next TNI Commander-in-Chief. Having consulted with Yudhoyono, the tim sukses 
assured Ryamizard that this would never happen. Interviews, July 2004.
48 For further information about the movement, see, for example, "Lagu Sumbang Soal Militerisme," 
Tempo, May 31-June 6, 2004. A PDI-P politician privately argued that the best timing of the 
anti-militarism campaign was July 27, the anniversary of the military suppression of Megawati 
supporters in 1996. But this strategy proved ineffective, since Megawati, who had subsequently protected 
the generals responsible for the violence, was ultimately branded a traitor to her own cause.
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Megawati campaign attempted to create a rift between the TNI and the Police by 
arguing that if Yudhoyono won, he would cave in under TNI pressure to shift the 
Police under the control of the Department of Interior, while allowing the TNI to be 
directly answerable to the president. This claim in effect goaded the police community 
into supporting Megawati in many areas. The TNI was again used as a strawman for 
defining Megawati's agenda, and this strategy served to deepen the division between 
the TNI and the Police.
In sum, TNI's stated commitment to neutrality did nothing to promote its leaders 
being "apolitical" in electoral politics. It is true that the post-Suharto TNI has no 
intention to support any particular political parties and has no capacity to directly 
mobilize votes or affect voter preferences. However, we wish to stress the significance 
of the process by which electoral politics—to some extent shaped by "star 
wars"—amplified suspicions, frictions, and cleavages within the military.
D. Yudhoyono Administration: Signals of Change
Yudhoyono's victory in the second round of the presidential election in September 
2004 marked the beginning of change for the TNI. His victory led to some 
breakthroughs in solving the serious problems that had plagued the military and the 
country during the Megawati era. These problems were, namely: the problem of 
Ryamizard, the war in Aceh, and TNI reform.
Just before the inauguration of Yudhoyono, outgoing president Megawati 
dropped a bombshell by announcing the resignation of Endriartono and her 
nomination of Ryamizard as TNI Commander-in-Chief.49 She justified her decision 
by referring to Endriartono's letter dated September 24, which allegedly tendered his 
resignation.50 Thanks to Megawati and Taufik Kiemas, Ryamizard had finally come 
one step closer to becoming Commander-in-Chief. But since the replacement of TNI 
Commander-in-Chief needed parliamentary approval by law, Ryamizard had to 
await the endorsement of the parliament.
This surprise nomination by the lame-duck president was, of course, not 
acceptable to the president-elect, who was expected to form a new government. Upon 
assuming the presidency on October 21, Yudhoyono promptly moved to block 
Ryamizard by sending a letter to the parliament on October 25 revoking Megawati's
49 "Panglima TNI Mundur," Koran Tempo, October 9, 2004. Megawati's decision was conveyed in her 
official letter to the parliament (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) (No.R32/PRES/X/2004 tgl 8 Oktober 
2004 tentang Pemberhentian dan Pengangkatan Panglima TNI).
50 TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin soon announced that Endriartono had sent the letter for 
three reasons: first, he wanted to promote reorganization within TNI; second, he had passed the 
mandatory retirement age of fifty-five years; and third, he wanted one of the current service chiefs to be 
selected as the next TNI commander. "Sutarto Munder Dengan Tiga Alasan," Koran Tempo, October 12, 
2004. However, political watchers voiced their skepticism of the TNI explanation. They knew that 
Endriartono was angered by Megawati's decision to award an "honorary star" to her loyal cabinet 
members, Hendropriyono and Hari Sabarno, on October 1, making them four-star generals. News of 
Endriartono's reaction reached Megawati, and she responded by using his letter of September 24 to 
announce his replacement. By the way, Sjafrie, a long-time ally of Prawono, who switched sides to join 
Wiranto's camp in the final days of Suharto's regime, was transferred to the Defense Department as 
secretary-general in April 2005.
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decision. Endriartono lent his support to this action by stating that he himself had 
been surprised by Megawati's announcement of his resignation. Endriartono said that 
the letter he had submitted to Megawati was not a resignation letter, but a response to 
her query about regenerating the military.51 Although his announcement created 
some confusion among the public, it would appear that Endriartono decided to 
support Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono argued that any change in the TNI leadership at this 
point was not timely because he needed to ensure stability, and therefore he 
instructed Endriartono to stay at his post for the time being. This effectively delayed 
Yudhoyono's plans for the leadership change in the TNI.
Yudhoyono's next step was to neutralize Ryamizard. Yudhoyono's inner circle 
envisioned the following scenario.52 First, the three current service chiefs would be 
replaced by new ones in a bid to promote the "regeneration" of TNI leadership, while 
sidelining Ryamizard. Then, the post of TNI Commander would be open to 
competition among generals who had served as service chiefs, including Ryamizard. 
If he abandoned Megawati and switched his loyalty to Yudhoyono, he would still 
have a chance to become the Commander. If he failed to do so, the chances are that 
the new TNI commander would come from the air force, which had never produced a 
TNI Commander in the past. After a year or so, he would be replaced again by the 
man who was army chief at that time.
Although the scenario sketched above did not foreclose the possibility of 
Ryamizard's promotion, his chances were extremely slim, given the fact that 
Yudhoyono disliked him. It was also said that Yudhoyono listened to his wife and 
brothers-in-law—namely Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono (Commander of First Infantry 
Division, Kostrad) and Col. Pramono Edhie Wibowo (officer seconded to TNI 
headquarters)—who were all opposed to the promotion of Ryamizard.53 When 
Yudhoyono announced the replacement of three service chiefs in mid-February, he 
elevated Deputy Army Chief of Staff Gen. Djoko Santoso to Army Chief of Staff, 
marginalizing Ryamizard. A month later, another reshuffle resulted in the promotion 
of officers, among others his in-laws, Erwin Sujono (to become Tanjungpura 
Commander overseeing Kalimantan) and Pramono Edhie Wibowo (promoted to 
become Deputy Commander-General of Kopassus).54 Djoko Santoso, trusted by 
Yudhoyono, is expected to remain Army Chief of Staff for at least one more year to
51 "TNI Sides with Susilo in Chief Dispute," Jakarta Post, November 2, 2004.
52 Interviews, January and March 2005.
53 Yudhoyono's wife, Kristiani, is the daughter of Lt. Gen. (ret) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, Army Special 
Force Commander in the transition from Soekarno to Suharto and architect of the New Order regime.
Her eldest sister married Erwin. Pramono Edhie Wibowo is the younger brother of Kristiani. A rising star 
of Class 1980, Wibowo commanded Kopassus Group-1 (special combat forces) in 1998 and Group-5 
(anti-terrorism) in 1999. Then he became an adjutant of Megawati when she was vice president, and he 
continued to serve her as presidential adjutant until the end of her term in October 2004. It is said that 
Megawati personally liked this young "professional" officer, in spite of his family link with Yudhoyono, 
so that she never replaced him. Wibowo was said to have been annoyed by Ryamizard, who suspected 
him of being Yudhoyono's "eyes" in the presidential palace. About Wibowo's experience in Kopassus, 
see, for example, Hamish McDonald, Desmond Ball, James Dunn, Gerry van Klinken, David Bourchier, 
Douglas Kammen, and Richard Tanter, eds., Masters o f Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East 
Timor in 1999 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002).
54 With this reshuffle, Erwin was given the opportunity to command a Kodam, a necessary qualification 
to becoming a potential candidate for Army Chief of Staff. Wibowo, on the other hand, became the first 
officer from the Class of 1980 to be promoted to general.
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hone his leadership. At just fifty-three-years-old, Djoko is in no hurry to be TNI 
Commander this year.55
Yudhoyono's decision regarding the appointment of the next TNI Commander 
seems to have been influenced by two other factors as well. First, Ryamizard is 
viewed by the US as a radical xenophobe, a staunch nationalist, anti-reformist, and 
war-freak who prefers heavy-handed tactics in dealing with secessionist movements 
in Aceh and Papua. The United States' reservations about Ryamizard were conveyed 
by Paul Wolfowitz to the president and most likely influenced his decision.
Second, the historic tsunami that hit Aceh on December 26, 2004 also influenced 
Yudhoyono. The immense tragedy of the tsunami worked a miracle by reopening the 
peace dialogue between the government and GAM, resulting in the historic peace 
accord in mid-August 2005.56 Yudhoyono, who had long been incapable of achieving 
a breakthrough in the war, now reaps the benefit of the peace accord. The success of 
the accord now depends on his ability to keep a tight rein on the local army, which 
has repeatedly sabotaged his previous Aceh initiatives. Understandably, Yudhoyono 
is hesitant to work with Ryamizard, a forceful proponent of the war in Aceh. 
Moreover, given that the future reconstruction of Aceh would be carefully monitored 
by the international community, Yudhoyono could not risk seeing his government 
humiliated by Ryamizard's machinations. This may be a compelling reason for 
Yudhoyono to choose Djoko Santoso over an air force general as the next TNI 
Commander, since an air force officer may be unable to deal with the problems of the 
army.
By making Ryamizard a lame duck general, Yudhoyono attempted to close the 
gap between the government and the TNI regarding political and security issues. The 
new peace deal in Aceh has so far not been sabotaged by the local army. Djoko has 
maintained a low public profile and is not likely to jeopardize his career by defying 
the president. The ever pragmatic Endriartono also has less incentive to challenge the 
government policy, because the smooth transition in Aceh is his main task before his 
retirement. Bungling this task might invite comparison with Wiranto, whose 
reputation was damaged by his handling of East Timor in 1999.
There are also encouraging signs of reform. As discussed earlier, Article 19 of the 
TNI bill provoked strong criticism in early 2003. Although it was dropped from the 
final version of the bill, there remained many legal ambiguities and loopholes that 
could potentially undermine civilian authority over the TNI. The public, concerned 
over the defense-security sector reform, demanded the postponement of the 
enactment of the draft law by the parliament. But military elites pressured the
55 For these arguments, see, for example, "Skenario yang berubah," Tempo, February 21-27, 2005. Djoko 
Santoso was deputy assistant for social and political affairs (Wassospol Kassospol) to Yudhoyono who 
served as TNI's chief of social and political staff (Kassospol TNI) and chief of territorial staff (Kaster TNI) 
from 1998 to 1999. TNI insiders allege that Djoko, like Ryamizard, is purely a "domestic product," but 
unlike Ryamizard, Djoko can communicate well with civilians, perhaps due to his experience in the social 
and political section headed by Yudhoyono.
56 The peace accord produced a seven-page Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed by 
the government representative and the GAM leader on August 15, 2005, in Helsinki. Under the MoU, 
GAM agreed, among other things, to give up its long-standing demand for independence and to disarm 
and demobilize its three thousand fighters, while the government agreed to withdraw TNI's 
reinforcement troops by December 2005 and to offer general amnesty to GAM members.
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Megawati government to pass the bill. In effect, the military exploited Megawati's 
lack of political will and the legislators' preoccupation with the electoral campaign 
and consequent lack of interest in scrutinizing the bill in order to have its way. 
Ryamizard, then Army Chief of Staff, stoked the fires of controversy by claiming that 
those who stood against the legislation of the TNI bill were aiding foreigners to divide 
the country.57 In the face of TNI lobbying, the DPR discussed the bill in August 2004, 
made minor revisions, and finally enacted it at the end of September. The public 
criticized the legislators' half-heartedness and failure to hear the public's concerns.58 
Consequently, the new law failed to bring about crucial reforms, such as the assertion 
of civilian supremacy, reform of the territorial command, and revision of the 
functional relationship between TNI and the Defense Department. Immediately after 
the enactment of the TNI law, the military spokesman gave his comment that TNI 
would not change its territorial structure because it was not demanded by the law.59
The roll-back initiative was born soon after Yudhoyono became the president. The 
civilian Minister of Defense and a professor of international relations, Juwono 
Sudarsono, invited civilian defense experts to help formulate the institutional reform 
of the TNI and, in November, announced the establishment of two working groups 
(Pokja) directly under the president: one designed to bring TNI under the authority of 
the Defense Department and the other to liquidate TNI's businesses. Endriartono 
immediately raised his objection to the plan to place the TNI under the authority of 
the Defense Department, since this would undermine TNI's political autonomy in 
civil-military relations; his protest was read as a warning to Juwono not to meddle in 
TNI's affairs.60 Juwono, however, remained unfazed. Since placing the TNI under the 
Defense Department required some amendments in the national defense law and the 
TNI law, he proceeded to work to strengthen the legal basis of military reform.
First, Juwono's Pokja sought to revise the duties of TNI. In the TNI law, the basic 
duties (tugas pokok) of the TNI are classified under two headings: (1) military 
operations for war; and (2) military operations other than war (OMSP, Operasi Militer 
Selain Perang). The latter includes, among other things, operations aimed at 
combating armed separatist movements, armed insurgencies, and terrorist activities, 
as well as aiding the police in maintaining security and order.61 TNI's "dual 
function" of engaging in conventional warfare and OMSP is problematic, since the
57 "Pihak Asing Intervensi RI Melalui Penolakan RUU TNI," Media Indonesia, July 27, 2004.
58 An alliance of NGOs, for example, condemned the DPR for limiting their participation in the 
law-making process. See the report by Koalisi untuk Kibijakan Partisipatif (KKP), "Siaran Press: RUU 
TNI Tidak Partisipatif," August 19, 2005.
59 "UU TNI Tak Ubah Struktur TNI," Suara Pembaruan, October 2, 2004.
60 "Panglima Minta Dephan Batas Diri Bicara TNI," Media Indonesia, November 9, 2004; "Panglima TNI 
Keberatan TNI Diletakkan di Bawah Dephan," Kompas, November 9, 2004. Under the TNI law (i.e., UU 
No.43/ 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia), the TNI continues to be directly responsible to the 
president when performing its chief duties, while its administrative function is coordinated with the 
Defense Department. Regarding TNI business, the TNI law (article 76) stipulates that the government 
take over all military businesses either directly or indirectly within five years. Inclusion of this article in 
the law was one of a few real achievements, as it was not mentioned in the draft bill submitted by the 
government. Clearly it was part of a TNI compromise, accepted in return for the exclusion of other 
articles that would have reshaped the TNI, such as liquidation of territorial commands and the 
establishment of civilian supremacy.
61 See Article 7 (clause 2) of the TNI law.
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OMSP, without proper checks and balances, can be used to legitimize permanent 
military engagement in nonmilitary fields and provide opportunities for the TNI to 
expand its political power. Therefore, the working group is preparing an amendment 
to delete the OMSP from TNI's basic duties and thereby limit TNI's basic duty to 
conventional warfare. This legal framework will downgrade the OMSP to a 
"supporting task" (tugas bantuan), which consists of four categories: civic mission, 
humanitarian relief, UN peace-keeping operation and assistance to the police in 
maintaining security and public order. Moreover, a separate bill, aimed at regulating 
tugas bantuan—especially TNI's collaborations with the police—is now in 
preparation.62 Such an attempt to limit TNI's autonomy in conducting OMSP is 
meant to control the institutional power of the military.
Second, regarding the issue of the territorial command, it has been suggested that 
the traditional army-dominated system should be revised to integrate all three 
services for territorial defense. To this end, a proposal has been advanced by the Pokja 
for the establishment of a Regional Defense Command (Komando Daerah Pertahanan, 
or Kodahan), in which all services will jointly operate. This plan calls for organizing 
five Kodahans, each consisting of an army division, an air force squadron, and a navy 
fleet.63 This plan is not meant to dismantle the territorial command of the TNI, but 
rather to neutralize army power by merging all three services into a single territorial 
structure and "embedding" the local army in the wider command authority. This 
innovation is expected to reduce the political autonomy of the local army.
Finally, on the relationship between TNI and the Defense Department (Dephan), 
there is proposal to add a clause to Article 12 of the TNI law, placing the military 
organization under Dephan. This proposal seeks to promote the principle of civilian 
supremacy and accountability in the administrative, operational, and financial affairs 
of the TNI. The concept of "TNI under Dephan" is also expected to wrest a degree of 
political autonomy away from the TNI, whose role will be strictly limited to the 
execution of defense policies formulated by the government.
All these initiatives reflect the Yudhoyono administration's attempt to reformulate 
civil-military relations. With Endriartono remaining loyal, Ryamizard out in the cold, 
and Djoko adopting a low profile, Aceh now faces the prospect of demilitarization, 
despite the danger of a possible backlash, and some reform drives have been initiated 
to bring about a new equilibrium in civil-military relations. Yet, clearly the legacy of 
the past continues to cast a long shadow over the Yudhoyono government, which 
must strive to overcome the TNI's institutional inertia in other problem areas, such as 
the escalating violence in Papua (and West Irian Jaya) and the perpetuation of TNI 
illegal business. Among the alarming developments are the beefing up of troop 
strength and the mobilizing of military-backed militias in preparation for "civil war" 
in Papua.64 Papua's "special autonomy" budget has been untransparently consumed
62 The bill that is now drafted is RUU Tentang Tugas Perbantuan Tentara Nasional Indonesia. This bill 
also requires some amendments in the Police Law of 2002.
63 Five Kodahans and their overseeing areas are as follows. Kodahan 1/ Sumatra, Kodahan II/Java and 
Bali, Kodahan III / Kalimantan, Kodahan IV / Sulawesi, NTT and NTB, and Kodahan V / Maluku and 
Papua. This plan targets the amendment of Article 11 (on defense posture) of the TNI law.
64 "Stirring Up Conflict in West Papua," Topol Bulletin, March 2005; "West Papua Military Build-up 
Threatens Land of Peace Campaign," Tapol Briefing Paper, June 25, 2005.
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by local military elites who have also benefited from the Freeport-Moran protection 
business.65 Concerned Indonesians have called for an end to TNI's involvement in 
underground businesses, such as illegal logging and human, drug, and arms 
trafficking, all illegal activities that frequently end up in the news. To show his 
commitment to reformasi, Yudhoyono officially launched his "war on illegal logging," 
which, if seriously conducted, could be a real threat to military officers involved in the 
crime. Whether the current reform drive under Yudhoyono will be able to solve these 
problems remains to be seen.
65 Global Witness, "Paying for Protection: The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces" 
(Washington, DC: Global Witness Publication, July 2005); "Indonesian Military Using Aid Funds for 
Military Operations: Australian Report," Agence France Presse, March 16, 2005.
Cutoff Data: August 2005
Office
Officeholder
Date and Place of Birth, Ethnic 
Origin
Class and date of graduation 
Divisional or Service Background 
Date of Installation 
Officeholder's previous post
Armed Forces Headquarters
Commander-in-Chief of the TNI
- Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
b. Aug. 1,1944, Boyolali 
(Central Java), Javanese 
Navy Academy 1968 
Navy
5 xi 99 - 7 vi 02
Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of TNI
- Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. Apr. 29,1947, Purworejo 
(Central Java), Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
7 vi 02 -  (38 months)
Army Chief of Staff
Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)
- Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago




8 iii 2000 -  16 ii 04 
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
retired
- Air Vice-Marshal Wartoyo
Javanese
Navy Academy 1971 
16 ii 04 -
Deputy Chief, Air Force
Inspector-General (Irjen TNI)




1 v 02 -  24 x 03 (retire)
- Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman




24 x 03 -
Commander, Military Staff and 
Command School
Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to 
TNI Commander-in-Chief
- Vice-Admiral Djoko Sumarjono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1973 
Navy
3 ii 0 3 - 2 4 x 0 3





24 x 03 -  2 viii 05 
not yet announced
Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) to Chief 
of the General Staff 
-Maj. Gen. (Marines) Mochammad 
Luthfie Witto 
Navy Academy 1972
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Marines
1 vii 02 -  24 vi 03
Director, Directorate "C," BAIS
- Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto66
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
24 vi 03 -  12 iv 05 
Assistant for Security to Army 
Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal




16 v 0 5 -
Commander, Kodam Trikora
Assistant for Operations (Asops) to Chief of 
the General Staff




c. 5 xi 99 -
Commander, Kodam XI 
Udayana
Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to 
Chief of the General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. Mar. 10,1949, Balinese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry





21 vii 03 - 16 v 05 
Commander, Kodam 
Tanjungpura 
-Maj. Gen. Symsul Ma'arif
b. Sept. 27,1950, Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
16 v 0 5 -
Assistant for Social
Communication to Military 
Chief of General Staff
Assistant for Personnel (Aspers) to Chief of 
General Staff 




15 vi 01 - 3 ii 03 
Commander, Kodam II 
Sriwijaya
66 Former military attache to the United 
States.




3 ii 03 -  (30 months)
Director of Education, Army 
Education and Training 
Command
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog) to Chief of 
General Staff
- Air Vice-Marshal Mburak Ginting
Karo Batak 
Air Force 
1 vii 02- 3 xi 04
Assistant for Communications 
and Electronics to Military 
Chief of General Staff
- Air Vice-Marshal K. Inugroho
Air Force 
3 xi 04 -
Assistant for Social Communications 
(Askomsos) to Chief of General Staff




15 ii 01 -  ? 03
Deputy Assistant for Territorial 
Affairs to Military Chief of 
Territorial Staff 
-Maj. Gen. SyamsulMa'arif
b. September 27,1950, Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
? 03 - 1 6  v 05
not yet announced
Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic 
Intelligence Body)
- Air Vice Marshall Ian Santoso
Perdanakusuma
b. July 17,1948, Madurese 
Air Force Academy 1970 
Air Force
12 i 2000 -  24 vi 03 (36.5 months) 
Commander, Air Force 2nd 
Operational Command
- Lt. Gen. (Marines) Mochammad Luthfie
Witto
Navy Academy 1972 
24 vi 0 3 -
Assistant for Intelligence to
Military Chief of General Staff
Deputy Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic 
Intelligence Body)





1 x 01 -  still in the post as of viii 
04
Director, Directorate "A," BAIS
Central Executive Organs
Commander-General, Military Academy 
(Danjen Akademi TNI)
- Air Rear-Marshal Suprihadi
Javanese 
Air Force 
? vi 02 - ? ii 03
- Vice-Admiral Wahyu Sasongko
Javanese
Navy
? ii 03 -  16 ii 04 
Governor, Navy Academy
- Vice-Admiral Heru Srijanto
Javanese 
Navy 
16 ii 04 -
Assistant for Personnel Affairs to 
Navy Chief of Staff
Commander, Military Staff and Command 
School (Sesko TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman








- Air Rear-Marshal Herman Prayitno
b. January 9,1951, Javanese 
Air Force Academy 1973 
24 x 03 -  16 ii 04
- Rear-Admiral Sumardjono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1973 
16 ii 04 -
Assistant for General Planning to 
Navy Chief of Staff
Head, Military Mental Upbuilding Center 
(Pusbintal)




? xii 02 -  (3.5 months) still in the 
post
Chief of Staff, Kodam 
Tanjungpura
Head, Military Research and Development 
Center (Puslitbang)




15 ii 01 -  (24.5 months)
Expert Staff for Economics and 
Finance to the TNI 
Commander-in-Chief
Head, Military Center of History and 
Tradition (Pusjarah)
- Brig. Gen. Busri Boer
Akmil 1971 
Engineers
15 ii 2001 - ?
Head, Army Mental Upbuilding 
Service (Kadisbintalad)
- Brig. Gen. M. Fahlevi
Akmil 1974 
Infantry 
? - as ot ix 04
Head, Military Police Center (Puspom)




c. 14 iii 02 -  25 v 04 
staff, Lemhannas 




21 v 04 -
Deputy Assistant for Security to 
Army Chief of Staff
Head, Military Information Center (Puspen) 
-Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin




c. 15 ii 02 -  12 iv 05
Expert Staff Coordinator for the 
TNI Commander-in-Chief
- Temporary held by Brig. Gen. Suhartono
Suratman (Deputy Head, Military 
Information Center)




16 v 05 -
Expert Staff Coordinator for the 
TNI Commander-in-Chief
Head, Military Legal Upbuilding Body 
(Babinkum)




15 vi 98 - 1  vii 02 (48.5 months) 
Auditor General of the TNI
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- Maj. Gen. F.X. J. Sukiman
Javanese 
Akmil 1973
1 vii 02 -  still in the post 
Deputy Head, Military Legal 
Upbuilding Body
Head, Military Supply Body (Babek)
- Brig. Gen. Amari
Akmil 1973 
Ordnance 
c. 1 5 i i0 2 -2 5 v 0 4  
Officer seconded to Logistics Staff, 
TNI Headquarters (Paban 
II/Bekum Slog TNI)




25 v 04 -
Commander, Western Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Djoko Sumaryono
b. July 14,1951, in Bandung, 
Javanese
Navy Military Academy 1973 
Navy
15 vi 01 -  3 ii 03 (19.5 months) 
Assistant for Security to Navy 
of Staff




3 ii 03 -  24 x 03




24 x 03 -  25 v 05
Chief of Staff, Western Fleet




25 v 05 -
attached to Lemhannas
Commander, Eastern Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Slamet Subiyanto
Javanese
Navy
3 ii 03 -  24 x 03
Assistant for General Planning to 




24 x 03 -  25 v 05 
Waasops KSAL
- Rear-Admiral Y. Didik Heru Purnomo
Javanese
Navy
25 v 05 -
Commander, Western Fleet
Head, National Air Defense Command 
(Kohanudnas)
- Air-Vice Marshal Wresniwiro S.E.
Javanese
Air Force Academy 
12 x i0 2 - 2 4 x 0 3
- Air-Vice Marshal F. Djojo Poerwoko
Javanese
Air Force Academy 
24 x 03 -  v 05
- Air-Vice Marshal Sonny Rizani
Air Force Academy 
V 0 5 -
Service Heads and Army Hierarchy
Army Chief of Staff
- Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu




3 vi 02 - 1 6  ii 05 
Commander, Kostrad
- Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8,1952, in Solo, Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry 
16 ii 05 -
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Navy Chief of Staff
- Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh
b. July 9,1948, Minahasa, North 
Sulawesi, Menadonese 
Navy Academy 1970 
Navy
1 v 02 -  16 ii 05
Navy Inspector-General of the 
TNI
- Admiral Slamet Soebijanto
b. June 4,1951, in Mojokerto, 
Javanese 
Navy
Navy Academy 1973 
16 ii 05 -
Deputy Governor, Lemhannas
Air Force Chief of Staff
- Air Marshal Chappy Hakim
b. December 17,1947, Yogyakarta, 
Javanese
Air Force Academy 1971 
29 iv 02-16 ii 05 
Commander-General, TNI 
Academy
- Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto
b. Dec. 2,1950, in Madiun, 
Javanese
Air Force Academy 1973
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Air Force 
16 ii 05 -
Assistant for Operations to Air 
Force Chief of Staff
Commander of Marine Corps
- Maj. Gen. TNI (Mars) Achmad Rifai
b. August 22,1950, Javanese 
Navy Academy 1972 
Marines 
15 xi 02 -  25 x 04 
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps 




25 x 04 -
Commander, Navy Education 
and Training Command (Dan 
Kodiklatal)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Darsono




c. 3 ii 03 -  24 x 03 
Commander, TNI's Education
and Training Command (Dan 
Kodiklat TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8,1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
24 x 03 -  15 ii 05
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Lt. Gen. Endang Suwarya




c. 30 iii 05 -
Commander, Kodam Iskandar 
Muda
Army Inspector General
- Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya




3 ii 0 3 - 2 4 x 0 3  
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon




2 4 x 0 3 -
Commander, Army Territorial 
Center (Danpusterad)
Assistant for Security (Aspam)
- Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
3 ii 03-24 vi 03
- Maj. Gen. Yogi (Yudhi) Magio Yusuf
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
24 vi 03 -
Assistant for Operations (Asops)
- Maj. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon
b. July 14,1951, Pangurunan, N.
Sumatra, Toba Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
3 ii 0 3 - 2 5 x 0 4  
Commander, Kodam 
IV / Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. I wan Ridwan Sulandjana




31 i 05 -
Commander, Kodam Siliwangi
Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)
- Maj. Gen. Mohamad Husni Thamrin Razak
Akmil 1972 
Infantry 
15 vi 01 -  ? 03
Expert Staff Coordinator for 
Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Tanri Bali Lamo
7 0 3 -
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)




15 vi 01 - ? 03
Director for Planning and Budget, 
Department of Defense




Assistant for Planning and Budget (Asrena)
- Maj. Gen. Bambang Sutedjo
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
3 v 02 -  9 xii 04
- Maj. Gen. G.R. Situmeang
Akmil 1974 
Infantry 
9 xii 04 -
Coordinator of Expert Staff for 
Army Chief of Staff
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Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)




14 xi 02 -  25 v 04
Commander, Kodam Sriwijaya
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno




25 v 04 -
Commander, Army Territorial 
Center (Danpuster AD)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve 
(Kostrad)
- Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo




c. 1 vii 02 -  24 ix 04 
Commander, Kodam Jaya
Temporarily held by Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. Ryamizard
- Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo




25 x 04 -
Commander, Army Education 
and Training Command
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve 
(Kostrad)













Commander, Infantry Weapons 
Center
Commander, First Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve




c. 1 vii 02 -  ? ix 03
Deputy Army Inspector-General 
to the Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
?ix 0 3 - 2 5  v 04
- Maj. Gen. George Toisutta
b. 1953, Ambonese 
Akmil 1976 
Infantry 
25 v 04 - 1 6  v 05 
Commander, TNI Operation 
Command in Nanggoe Aceh 
Darussalam (Pangkoops NAD)
- Maj. Gen. Bambang Suranto
b. Oct. 6,1952, Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
16 v 05 -
Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya
Commander, Second Infantry Division, 
Army Strategic Reserve




c. 1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months) 
Chief of Staff, Kodam Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono
b. Feb. 5,1951, Bandung, Javanese 
Akmil 1975
Infantry
c. 3 ii 03 -  30 iii 05
Chief of Staff, Kodam Siliwangi




30 iii 05 -
Chief of Staff, Kodam Bukit 
Barisan
Governor, General and Army Division, 
Military Academy (Akmil)




c. 15 ii 02 - 3 ii 03 (11.5 months) 
with Lemhannas




3 ii 03 -
Deputy Commander, Army Staff 
and Command School
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Commander, Army Staff and Command 
School (Seskoad)
- Maj. Gen. Willem Da Costa




c. 1 vii 0 2 - 9  vii 03 
Commander, Kodam Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Syariffudin Tippe




9 vii 03 -
Deputy Commander, Seskoad
Commander, Education and Training 
Command (Kodiklat)
- Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo




c .  3ii 0 3 - 2 5 x 0 4
Infantry Assistant for Operations 
to the Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon




25 x 04 -
Assistant for Operations to Army 
Chief of Staff
Commander, Army Infantry Weapons 
Center (Pussenif TNI-AD)




c. 15 ii 02 - ? 03
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic 
Reserve (Kostrad)




? 03 -  25 v 04
-Maj. Gen. Arif Budi Sampurno 
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
25 v 04 -  16 v 05 
Previously Pangdiv I Kostrad




16 v 0 5 -
Expert Staff to TNI 
Commander-in-Chief
Commander, Army Territorial Center 
(Puster TNI-AD)
- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon




c. 3 ii 0 3 - 2 4 x 0 3  
Commander, Kodam XI/ Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno




24 x 03 -  25 v 04
Commander, Kodam Deponegoro 
(only for temporary)




25 v 04 - 1 6  v 05
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command




16 v 05 -
Commander, Kodam Wirabuana
Commander-General, Special Forces 
Command (Kopassus)




c. 1 vii0 2 -3 1  i 05
Deputy Commander-General,
Kopassus




31 i 05 -
Chief of Staff, Kasdam 
Tanjungpura
Deputy Commander General, Special Forces 
Command (Kopassus)




? -  24 x 03
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30 iii 05 -
Presidential adjutant to Megawati
Commander, Presidential Security Guard 
(Paspampres)
- Maj. Gen. (Mars) Nono Sampono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1976 
Marines
20 viii 01 -  28 iii 03 
Deputy Commander, Presidential 
Security Guard





28 iii 03 -
Regional Military Leaders [Commanders]
Kodam (Military Region Command) I/Bukit 
Barisan (North Sumatra)
Commander, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan 
-Maj. Gen. Tri Tamtomo Panggabean 




7 x 02 -  still in the post 
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
Chief of Staff, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan












24 vi 03- 30 iii 05 
Deputy Assistant for Security to 
Army Chief of Staff




30 iii 05 -
Deputy Assistant for Security to 
Army Chief of Staff
Korem 022 Pantai Timur (Pematang Siantar)




27 iv 02 -  ?





? (as of 17 viii 05) -
Korem 023 Kawal Samudera (Sibolga)




24 iv 01 -
Commander, Core Regiment, 
Kodam Siliwangi
- Col. Agung Revulton
Akmil 1977
? (as of 29 vii 02) -  xi 04 - ? 
Commander, 18th Infantry 
Brigade, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
- Col. Eddy (Edi) Hartanto
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
? (as of 27 vii 05) -
Korem 031 Wirabima (Pekanbaru)
- Col. Darmawi Chaidir
Akabri 1974 
Infantry




? ix 03 -  4 iii 05
- Col. Hambali Hanafiah
Akmil 1978 
Infantry
4 iii 05 -





26 ix 2000 - 1 0  iv 03 







10 iv 03 -  (as of ii 05) -
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Kodam II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra) 
Commander Kodam II/ Sriwijaya 




? xii 02 -  24 x 03 
Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya 
-Maj. Gen. SjahrialPeliung
b. June 6,1950, Minangkabau 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
24 x 03 -
Chief of Staff, Kodam Sriwijaya
Chief of Staff, Kodam II/ Sriwijaya 
-Brig. Gen. SjahrialB.P. Peliung
b. June 6,1950, Minangkabau 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
? xii 02 -  24 x 03 
Officer seconded to Army 
Education and Training 
Command (Pabanlat Kodiklat 
AD)




24 x 03 - 1 6  v 05
- Brig. Gen. Karsadi




16 v 05 -
Deputy Assistant for Territorial 
Affairs to Army Chief of Staff





1 3 x i 0 2 -?
- Col. Sutan Lubis
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (as of viii 05) -
Korem 042 Garuda Putih (Jambi)
- Col. Juktayana Tjitra Wasita
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
30 x 00 - 1 3  xi 02 (25 months) 
Coordinating Officer, Expert Staff, 
Army Information Service
- Col. Mulhim Asyrof
Akmil 1976 
Engineers










1 vi 05 -
Korem 043 Garuda Hitam (Lampung)
- Col. Chairuddin Azis




23 iv 02 -  15 ii 05 
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, 
Army Strategic Reserve 
Command




15 ii 05 -
Assistant for Personnel Affairs, 
Kodam Jaya
Korem 044 Garuda Dempo (Palembang)
- Col. Djafar Sofyan
Akmil 1975 
Engineers 
12 iv 02 -  (? ix 04) - 
Assistant for Planning, Kodam, 
Brawijaya




? (as of iii 05) -
Kodam III/Siliwangi (West Java) 
Commander, Kodam M / Siliwangi
- Maj. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana




c. 1 vii 0 2 -3 1  i05  
Chief of Staff, Kodam
III / Siliwangi
- Maj. Gen. Sriyanto
b. Oct. 26,1950, Javanese 
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Special Forces)
31 i 05 -
Commander-General, Army 
Special Forces
Chief of Staff Kodam III / Siliwangi
- Brig. Gen. Erwin Sujono
b. Feb. 5,1951, in Bandung, 
Javanese
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Akabri 1975 
Infantry
1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months) 
Chief of Staff, First Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve




c. 3 ii 03 -  (as of vii 05) - 
Commander, Korem 061 Bogor





16 i 01 - c. 6 ii 03 (25 months) 
Commander, Core Regiment, 





3 xii 03 - (ii 05) -





Korem 062 Tarumanegara (Garut)
- Col. Osaka Meliala




? iv 0 2 - 1 8  vi 05 
Assistant for Planning, First 
Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve Command
- Col. Nana Sudjana
Akmil 1978
b. in Kuningan, Javanese
Engineers
18 vi 05 -
Korem 063 Sunan Gunung Jati (Cirebon)




6 xi 02 -  (ii 05) -





Korem 064 Maulana Yusuf (Serang)




c. 26 ix 2000 -  (vi 03) - ?
Assistant for Planning, Kodam 
Sriwijaya




? (by iii 04) -  (iv 05) -
Kodam IV/Diponegoro (Central Java) 
Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni




c. 3 ii 03 -  vi 03 (died) 
Commander, Kodam Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno




21 ix 03 -  24 x 03 (1 month: 
temporary)
Commander, Kodam Udayana 




24 x 03 -
Commander, Kodam Sriwijaya
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV / Diponegoro
- Brig. Gen. Salim Mengga
Akmil 1974 
Cavalry
c. 3 ii 03 -  6 i 04 
Commander, Army Cavalry
Weapons Center (Dan 
Pussenkav)
- Brig. Gen. Mochamad Sochib
Akmil 1975
Artillery
6 i 04 -  25 v 05
Commander, Army Artillery 
Weapons Center (Danpussenart)
- Brig. Gen. Rasyid Qurnuen
Akmil 1975
25 v 05 -
attached to Lemhannas
Korem 071 Wijayakusuma (Purwokerto)
- Col. Mufad Santoso
Akmil 1973
Engineers













3 iv 05 -





17 v 0 2 - 5  iii 05
Personal Secretary, Army Chief of 
Staff




5 iii 05 -
Korem 073 Makutarama (Salatiga)




26 ix 2000 -  (v 03) - ?
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, 
Kodam Diponegoro ?




? -  (xii 03) -
Korem 074 Warastratama (Solo)




? v 02 -  28 i 05
- Col. Tisna Komara
Javanese 
Infantry 
28 i 05 -
Kodam V/Brawijaya (East Java)
Commander, Kodam V/Brawijaya
- Maj. Gen. Achmad Djunaedi Sikki




1 x 01 -  16 v 05
Commander, Second Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command




16 v 05 -
Commander, Army Territorial 
Center
Chief of Staff, Kodam V / Brawijaya




1 vii 02 -  (37 months, as of viii 05)
Korem 081 Dhirot Saha Jaya (Madiun)




c. 9 v 01 -  ? (by ix 04) 






? (by ix 04) -






7 v 02 -  4 iii 05
Assistant for Logistics, Kodam 
Brawijaya




4 iii 05 -
Inspector, Kodam Udayana
Korem 083 Baladhika Jaya (Malang)
- Col. Hadi Lukmono




10 ix 02 - ?
Commander, Artillery Education 






23 iii 05 -
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Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya)
- Col. Soedarsono




13 ix 01 -  (as of ii 02) ?
Assistant for Territorial Affairs,
Kodam Brawijaya




? (by i 04) -  vii 05




? vii 05 -
Kodam VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan) 
Commander, Kodam VI/ Tanjungpura




14 xi 02 -2 1  vii 03
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to 
Army Chief of Staff




21 vii 03 -  30 iii 05 
Chief of Staff, Kodam 
Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono




30 iii 05 -
Commander, Second Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/ Tanjungpura




1 x 01 - ?
Deputy Assistant for Personnel 
Affairs to Army Chief of Staff




? -  16 vii 03




16 vii 0 3 -2 1  ix 03
- Brig. Gen. Syaiful Rizal
Jambinese 
Akmil 1975
Infantry (special forces) 
c. 24 x 03 -  31 i 05 
Deputy Commander-General, 
Army Special Forces
- Brig. Gen. Djoko Susilo Utomo




31 i 05 -
Chief of Staff, Second Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
Korem 091 Aji Suryanatakusuma 
(Balikpapan)




3 v 02 -  24 x 03
- Col. Amreyza Anwar
Akmil 1975 
Infantry 
24 x 03 -
Korem 101 Antasari (Banjarmasin)
- Col. Sudarmaidy S.
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 20 iv 01 -  ? (by ix 03)
- Col. Junianto Haroen
Akmil 1976 
Infantry 
? (by ix 03) -
Korem 102 Panju Panjung (Palangka Raya)
- Col. Hatta Syafrudin
Akmil 1976 
Infantry




? (by 5 x 04) - ? 05
- Col. L.Sigers
Infantry 
? (by vii 05) -
Korem 121 Alambhana Wana Wai 
(Pontianak)




? (by 3 v 02) -  3 ii 05





3 ii 05 -
Kodam Vll/Wirabuana (Sulawesi) 
Commander, Kodam VII/ Wirabuana 




3 ii0 3 -1 6  v05
Chief of Staff, Kodam Wirabuana 
-Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno 
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
16 v 05 -
Commander, Army Infantry 
Weapons Center
Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/ Wirabuana




3 ii 03 -  c. 31 xii 03 
Deputy Assistant for Territorial 
Affairs to Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Muslihan Sulchan
Akmil 1974 
Artillery 
31 xii 03- 31 i 05 
Deputy Commander, Army 
Territorial Center (Wadan 
Pusterad)




31 i 05 -
Korem 131 Santiago (Manado)




c. 26 ix 2000 - ? 03 
Commander, Core Regiment, 
Kodam Wirabuana
- Col. Darpito P
Akmil 1975 
Cavalry
? (by iii 03) -  30 iii 05




30 iii 05 -




? (by 9 vi 01) -  ? 03




? (by x 03) -
Korem 141 Toddopuli (Watambone)




c. 1 v 02 -  as of 9 iv 04 
Assistant for Operations, Kodam 
Brawijaya
Korem 142 Taroada Tarogaru (Pare Pare)




? (by i 02) - ?




? -  as of x 03
Korem 143 Haluoleo (Kendari)




c. 7 i 03 -  ?
- Col. Tan Aspan
Akmil 1976 
Infantry
? (by 24 viii 04) - 4 viii 05
- Col. Moch. Wachju Rijanto (Riayanto)
Akmil 1977 
Cavalry 
4 viii 05 -
Kodam XVII/Trikora (Irian Barat) 
Commander, Kodam XVII/ Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal




3 ii 03 - 1 6  v 05 
Chief of Staff, Kodam Trikora
- Maj. Gen. George Toisutta
b. 1953, Ambonese 
Akabri 1976 
Infantry 
16 v 05 -
Commander, First Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/ Trikora
- Brig. Gen. Getson Manurung
b. January 4,1951, Batak
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Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii0 3 - 3 1  i 05
Officer seconded to Operations 
Staff, Army Headquarters 
(Paban II/Bintal Sopsad)
- Brig. Gen. Sudarmaidy (Sudarmaidji) S.
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
31 i 05 -
Deputy Assistant for Operations 
to Army Chief of Staff
Korem 171 Praja Vira Tana (Sorong)
- Col. Mangasa R. Saragih
b. in Medan, Simalungun Batak 
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. l x i 0 0 - ? 0 3
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam 
Trikora
- Col. Halasan Simanjuntak
Infantry 
Akmil 1974 
? (by ix 03) - ? 04
- Col. Christian Zebu (Zebua)
Akmil 1980 
Cavalry 
? (as of i 05) -
Korem 172 Praja Vira Yakthi (Abepura)




? (by 3 vii 02) -  (after 31 i 05)
- Col. Asis Wanto
Akmil 1980 
Infantry 
? (by vi 05) -
Korem 173 Praja Vira Braja (Biak)




15 viii 02 -  (as of 25 i 05) - ? 
Commander, Core Regiment, 
Kodeam Siliwangi
- Col. Erfi Triassunu
Infantry 
Akmil 1978 
? (by vi 05) -
Korem 174 Anim Ti Waninggap (Merauke)67
- Col. Kitaran Joy Sihotang
Infantry 
1 vi 05 -
Kodam XVI/Pattimura (Maluccas and North 
Moluccas)
Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura




3 ii 0 3 - 2 4 x 0 3  
Commander, Second Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
- Maj. Gen. Syarifuddin Suma (Sumah)




24 x 0 3 -
Chief of Staff, Kodam Pattimura, 
then Deputy Commander, 
Army Territorial Center
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
- Brig. Gen. Syarifuddin Sumah




c. 1 xi 2000 - 3 ii 03 (27 nonths) 
Commander, Korem 041
Bengkulu




3 ii 03 -
Korem 151 Maluku (Ambon)68
- Col. Tony Husodo
Javanese 
Infantry 
18 iii 0 3 -
Korem 152 Maluku Utara (Ternate)69





Kodam IX/Udayana (Bali, East and West 
Nusatenggara)
Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana 
-Maj. Gen. Agus Soeyitno




c. 1 vii 02 -  21 ix 03
Chief of Staff, Kodam Udayana
67 Newly established on June 1, 2005.
68 Newly established on March 18, 2003. 
Newly established on March 18, 2003.
158 The Editors
- Maj. Gen. Supiadin Yusus A.S.
Sundanese 
Akmil 1975 
21 ix 03 -  30 iii 05 
Chief of Staff, Kodam 
Tanjungpura




30 iii 05 -
Commander, Kodam 
Tanjungpura
Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana
- Brig. Gen. T.H. Sinambela
b. in Medan, Toba Batak 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 -  26 ix 03
Officer seconded to Territorial 
Staff, Army Headquarters




26 ix 03- 31 i 05
- Brig. Gen Baharudin (Burhanudin) Amin
Akmil 1976 
Infantry
31 i 05 -
Chief of Staff, First Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
Korem 161 Wirasakti (Kupang)
- Col. Muswarno Moesanip
Akmil 1975
Infantry
2 x 01- 4 iii 05
- Col. Amir Hamka Manan
Akmil 1976 
Infantry 
4 iii 05 - ? vii 05 
-Col. AJPNochBola 
Infantry 
? (by 18 vii 05) -
Korem 162 Wirabhakti (Mataram)




30 x 00 -  28 vii 03 
Inspector of Personnel, Army 
Inspectorate-General




28 vii 03 -
Korem 163 Worasatya (Denpasar)




14 v 0 2 - 2  viii 03 
Commander, Group-2, Army 
Special Forces (Kopassus)




2 viii 03 -  (as of 1 v 05) -
Kodam X/Jaya (Greater Jakarta)
Commander, Kodam Jaya 
-Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8,1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
3 ii 03 -  24 x 03
Commander, Kodam Pattimura 




24 x 03 -
Commander, Kodam Pattimura
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
- Brig. Gen. George Toisutta
b. 1953, Ambonese 
Akmil 1976 
Infantry 
3 ii 03 -  8 xii 03
Chief of Staff, Second Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve Command
- Brig. Gen. Mochamad Irianto




8 xii 03 - 1 6  v 05
Chief of Staff, Garnison I/Jakarta




16 v 0 5 -
Chief of Staff, Garnison I/Jakarta
Korem 051 Wijayakarta (Jakarta Timur)




9 iv 02 -  (as of 29 x 04) - 
Staff, Army Intelligence Center
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c. 1 x 00 -  ?
Commander, Core Regiment, 
Kodam Sriwijaya
- Col. Jul Effendi Sjarief
Akmil 1976 
Infantry
? (As of 2 9 x 0 4 ) -
Kodam Iskandar Muda (Aceh)
Commander, Kodam Iskandar Muda 
-Maj. Gen. Djalijusuf
b. 1949, Pidie, Aceh, Acehnese 
Akmil 1972 
5 v 02 -  13 v 03
Deputy Commander, Military 
Operations Command in 
Nangroe Aceh Darussalam
- Maj. Gen. Endang Suwaryo




13 v 03 -  30 iii 05 
Chief of Staff, Kodam Isdandar 
Muda




30 iii 05 -
Pangdam Udayana
Chief of Staff, Kodam Iskandar Muda
- Brig. Gen. Endang Suwaryo




3 ii 03 - 1 3  v 03
Deputy Assistant for Operations 
to Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Muhammad Yahya (Jahja)
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
24 vi 03 -  30 iii 05




30 iii 05 -
Deputy Commander, Army Staff 
and Command School
Korem Oil Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe)
- Col. H. Azmyn Yusri Nasution
b. 1954, Medan, Mandaling Batak
Akmil 1977
Infantry
4 v 02 -  31 i 05
Assistant for Operations, Army 
Strategic Reserve Command




31 i 05 -
Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh)
- Col. Gerhan (Geerhan) Lantara
b. Bone, South Sulawesi, Bugis 
Akmil 1978 
Infantry 
2 v 02 -  31 i 05
Assistant for Operations, Kodam 
III / Siliwangi




31 i 05 -
